In the heyday of the “IBM PC” market, as it was known, there
were dozens of manufactures of PC “compatibles”. At the same time the Win-Tel (Windows and x86
Intel) franchise was moving rapidly up market eating away at the mini-computer
and UNIX server markets. The marketing
messages from the mini and server vendors was as expected; Lower performance, not
purpose built, not robust, etc. etc.
Yet, large system vendors such as DEC, AT&T, Unisys and
Wang felt the need to offer their own manufactured PCs and Win-Tel servers to be
able to offer the total system solution.
There are numerous interesting lessons from these dynamics, but let’s
focus only on the PC for now.
At this time Dell and Compaq were thriving selling the full
range of PCs and were starting to compete in the server market. These servers were priced around $80-100K. DEC and the other began to see the low margin
PCs, especially the consumer market, as a nuisance. DEC publically stated that they were
abandoning the “low end” PC market and were going to focus only on the high-end
office PC and server markets. Sounding
familiar Cisco? What happened was the Win-Tel
architecture dominated the server market and cut harshly in to the UNIX server
market. Compaq and Dell were the
winners. Why?
If you looked at the hardware components of a low end
consumer PC and a Win-Tel server they used many of the same components. Same memory chips, same processor family,
same disk drive family, etc. Compaq
participated in the high volume consumer PC market with volumes measured in 10’s
of millions. In this market gross
margins were 5% on a good day. However,
they were buying these common components in 10 million unit quantities from the
manufacturer.
DEC on the other hand was selling these $100K servers in the
10’s of thousands and “high end office” PCs in the low 100’s of thousands. Therefore, they were buying these common
components based on 100k unit pricing. When
Compaq sold a $100K server in 10K volumes they had component pricing in the 10
million unit range. Thus, by
participating in the low end high volume market they had a tremendous cost
advantage in the lower volume higher price market segment. In the end, Compaq bought DEC arguably for
the professional service business.
Will history repeat itself in the STB market? The “low-end”
and the “high-end” STBs share many common components. The argument
that STB are commodities anyway at the HW level makes sense in the short term.
The SW equivalent of Moore's Law, i.e., SW gets better with every release,
will mitigate any software advantage over time.
Regardless of a perceived short term software advantage, in the end,
since STB are roughly 50% of an SP CapEx, low price will always win. Adding the move to virtualizing the STB and the high end only STB strategy is doomed to fail.
To discuss this please contact me at gwhelan@greywale.com
For a list of other articles and blog post please see... www.greywale.com
For a list of other articles and blog post please see... www.greywale.com
Hi,
ReplyDeleteThanks for sharing this great info...
powerpoint download